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Payment Services Regulation (PSR)
Payment Services Regulation (PSR)
The Payment Services Regulation (PSR) is a directly applicable EU Regulation — meaning it takes effect across all EU member states without national transposition — that replaces the conduct provisions of PSD2 (the Second Payment Services Directive). It covers the rules that govern how payment services are delivered: Strong Customer Authentication (SCA), payment transparency, open banking access, fraud liability, and Verification of Payee. Its companion instrument, PSD3, is a Directive covering authorisation, licensing, and prudential requirements; PSD3 requires transposition and does not apply directly. Together, PSR and PSD3 repeal and replace PSD2 and the E-Money Directive (EMD2).
Legislative status and timeline
The European Commission published its proposal in June 2023. The European Parliament and Council reached a provisional trilogue agreement in November 2025. COREPER endorsed the final texts in April 2026 (published as Council documents ST-8221/2026 for PSR and ST-8222/2026 for PSD3); the European Parliament ECON committee voted in favour on 5 May 2026. Parliament plenary vote and Official Journal (OJ) publication are expected in H2 2026, with multiple sources citing December 2026 as the target. The PSR enters into force 20 days after OJ publication and applies 21 months after that — pointing to an application date of approximately H1 2028 (as-of 2026-10-23).
Scope and relationship to PSD2
PSR covers:
- Conduct obligations (SCA, exemptions, customer rights)
- Payment transparency and information requirements
- Open banking (access and performance)
- Fraud liability (including APP fraud and spoofing)
- Verification of Payee for non-euro credit transfers
PSD3 covers (separate instrument, requires transposition):
- Authorisation and licensing of payment institutions
- Prudential requirements
- E-money institution framework (replaces EMD2)
- Supervisory cooperation
The key structural change from PSD2 is that PSR's conduct rules are directly applicable across the EU from day one of application — no member state variation in implementation.
Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) under PSR
PSR retains the two-factor authentication requirement from PSD2 but introduces several changes (as-of 2026-10-23):
New provisions:
- Two-inherence-factor SCA explicitly permitted for the first time — a transaction may be authenticated using two biometric factors without a possession or knowledge element, provided both factors meet the independence and breach-containment requirements
- Smartphone-only SCA banned — a PSP cannot make a mobile app the sole SCA channel; at least one authentication route that does not require a smartphone must be available to customers
- Expanded SCA triggers — PSR explicitly adds wallet enrolment, changes to contact details, and modification of spending limits as events requiring SCA (these were implicit or PSP-by-PSP under PSD2)
- EBA RTS — the SCA Regulatory Technical Standards will be updated; the EBA has 12 months from PSR entry into force to deliver new RTS drafts (as-of 2026-10-23 these are not yet published)
Exemptions retained (from PSD2):
| Exemption | Threshold / condition |
|---|---|
| Low-value transaction (LVT) | €30 (or £25 in UK — UK not subject to PSR) per transaction; max 5 consecutive or €100 cumulative |
| Transaction Risk Analysis (TRA) | Fraud-rate bands: 0.13% → €100, 0.06% → €250, 0.01% → €500 |
| Merchant Initiated Transaction (MIT) | Out of SCA scope entirely — SCA performed at mandate setup |
| Trusted Beneficiary | Customer-stored list of trusted payees |
| Secure Corporate | Dedicated corporate payment protocols with equivalent controls |
| MOTO | Mail order / telephone order — no electronic authentication channel |
Key terms:
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| SCA | Strong Customer Authentication — 2-of-3 factor check (knowledge/possession/inherence) |
| Frictionless flow | Exemption applied automatically; cardholder not challenged |
| Challenge flow | Full SCA required; cardholder must complete authentication step |
| 3DS2 | EMV 3DS v2 protocol used to carry SCA data; frictionless/challenge determined by issuer |
| Soft decline | Issuer declines transaction and requests SCA; Visa code 1A, Mastercard code 65 |
Open banking under PSR
PSR makes a structural change to open banking access (as-of 2026-10-23):
Fallback interface removed — Under PSD2, ASPSPs (account-servicing PSPs, i.e. banks) were required to provide a fallback mechanism (including screen-scraping) if their dedicated API failed. PSR removes this fallback entirely. From PSR application date, the dedicated API is the sole access channel for Account Information Service Providers (AISPs) and Payment Initiation Service Providers (PISPs).
12 prohibited technical obstacles — PSR Article explicitly lists obstacles that ASPSPs may not place on open banking access, including: mandatory re-authentication more frequently than 180 days, redirect flows that require the customer to re-enter all credentials, unavailability of data fields present in the customer-facing channel, and differential treatment of API traffic vs. direct customer traffic in rate limiting or throttling.
Mandatory consent dashboard — Customers must be provided with a real-time dashboard showing all active open banking consents, with the ability to revoke any consent instantly. The revocation must be technically effective immediately (as-of 2026-10-23 PSD2 dashboards exist in some markets but without mandatory instant revocation).
API performance parity — The API must perform at the same availability and response-time level as the customer-facing channel. A downgrade in API performance (e.g. during peak retail periods) constitutes a prohibited obstacle.
Fraud liability under PSR
PSR shifts several fraud-liability positions from PSD2 (as-of 2026-10-23):
APP fraud (Authorised Push Payment fraud):
- PSP bears the full burden of proof that the customer's authentication was not compromised — the reversal from PSD2 where the customer bore the burden of showing gross negligence
- Refund right extends to all cases where a PSP fails transaction monitoring obligations
- PSR does not set a mandatory reimbursement cap or timeline — these are expected in EBA implementing technical standards
PSP impersonation / spoofing refund right:
- Customers have a refund right when they are deceived by a fraudster impersonating their PSP (spoofed calls, messages, websites)
- This right is narrower than the UK's APP fraud mandatory reimbursement framework (UK covers all APP fraud including romance scams and invoice fraud; PSR covers PSP-impersonation specifically)
- Maximum liability cap per incident: not yet set in draft texts seen (expected EBA RTS)
Transaction monitoring:
- Standalone mandatory obligation — PSPs must operate real-time transaction monitoring with defined detection criteria (not only for TRA exemption qualification as under PSD2)
- Methodology requirements expected in EBA technical standards
Mandatory multilateral fraud data sharing:
- PSPs operating in the EU must participate in fraud data sharing with other PSPs and competent authorities
- Mechanism and format: expected in EBA implementing technical standards
- This mirrors (but is more prescriptive than) the voluntary sharing frameworks that exist in the UK (e.g. Cifas) and some EU markets
VLOPs / DSA platform liability:
- PSR Article explicitly cross-references the Digital Services Act (DSA); Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) carry a liability share for APP fraud facilitated through their platforms when they fail DSA obligations
- Practical enforcement mechanism unclear at this stage; no case law exists (as-of 2026-10-23)
Verification of Payee (VoP) under PSR
PSR extends Verification of Payee obligations to non-euro credit transfers. Euro credit transfers were already covered by the Instant Payments Regulation (which mandated VoP for euro instant and standard credit transfers from October 2025). PSR closes the gap for non-euro currencies (as-of 2026-10-23).
UK divergence
The UK is not implementing PSR or PSD3. Following Brexit, the UK Payment Services Regulations 2017 (a domestic instrument based on PSD2) remain in force. The UK government's Payments Forward Plan (February 2026) confirmed the UK will use the FSMA-based framework to update payment services regulation, not align with EU PSR/PSD3 (as-of 2026-10-23).
Key UK divergences:
- APP fraud: UK already ahead — mandatory reimbursement for all APP fraud (not just PSP impersonation) has been in force since October 2024, with a £85,000 cap per claim
- Commercial VRPs: The UK launched commercial Variable Recurring Payments (VRPs — a form of open banking payment with merchant-controlled retry) in early 2026, ahead of any equivalent in the EU
- UK PSR (Payment Systems Regulator): The UK body called PSR is being absorbed into the FCA; the PSR acronym in a UK context refers to the Payment Systems Regulator, not the EU Payment Services Regulation — context matters
- Open banking performance: UK Open Banking still operates under the CMA Order and OBIE standards; PSR's API-parity rules do not apply
Key terms
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| PSR | Payment Services Regulation (EU) — directly applicable Regulation replacing PSD2 conduct provisions |
| PSD3 | Payment Services Directive 3 (EU) — companion Directive replacing PSD2 authorisation/licensing provisions |
| PSD2 | Second Payment Services Directive — instrument being replaced |
| EMD2 | Second E-Money Directive — instrument being replaced alongside PSD2 |
| ASPSP | Account Servicing Payment Service Provider — typically a bank that holds the customer's account |
| AISP | Account Information Service Provider — open banking read-access provider |
| PISP | Payment Initiation Service Provider — open banking payment initiation provider |
| APP fraud | Authorised Push Payment fraud — customer authorises a payment that turns out to be fraud |
| VLOP | Very Large Online Platform — DSA category; platforms with >45m EU monthly users |
| VoP | Verification of Payee — name-check on payee account before credit transfer |
| COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives — EU Council body; endorsement is near-final Council step |
| EBA | European Banking Authority — issues the SCA RTS and technical standards under PSR |
| OJ | Official Journal of the EU — publication makes regulation enter into force |
| VRP | Variable Recurring Payment — open banking payment type with reusable consent and merchant-controlled retry |
Benchmarks (as-of 2026-10-23)
- OJ publication target: December 2026 (widely cited; not yet confirmed)
- Application date: ~H1 2028 (21 months after entry into force)
- EBA SCA RTS deadline: 12 months after PSR entry into force
- UK APP fraud cap: £85,000 per claim (in force October 2024)
- LVT SCA exemption threshold: €30 per transaction, max €100 cumulative / 5 consecutive
What practitioners report
No Reddit practitioner signal available this run (MCP unavailable). YouTube metadata only (no transcripts; Apify unavailable). The SCA practitioners surveyed in the Strong Customer Authentication (SCA - PSD2) harvest (October 2026) noted that authentication failure and challenge abandonment are underdiagnosed because they appear as cart abandonment in standard analytics — this structural issue persists into the PSR era and the smartphone-only ban may expose further conversion impact for merchants whose primary SCA UX relies on a single app-based flow.